

# **The competitiveness of nuclear power in a low-carbon energy mix: results from recent OECD/NEA studies**

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## Projected Costs of Generating Electricity

2015 Edition

### Nuclear Energy and Renewables


System Effects in Low-carbon  
Electricity Systems



### Nuclear New Build: Insights into Financing and Project Management



## Global electricity production and technology shares in the IEA 2DS



Source: IEA, ETP2016

68% fossil fuels  
22% renewables  
11% nuclear

533 gCO<sub>2</sub>/kWh


17% fossil fuels  
67% renewables  
16% nuclear

40 gCO<sub>2</sub>/kWh

- A **complete reconfiguration** of the electricity generation system is needed by 2050.
- Rise of nuclear is accompanied by a *complete phase-out* of coal and oil, a drastic decrease of gas, development of CCS and a massive increase of renewable energies.
- **Will nuclear industry meet the expectations and deliver on time and on budget?**

**LCOE** is the constant unit price of output (\$/MWh) that would equalise the sum of discounted costs over the lifetime of a project with the sum of discounted revenues.

## LCOE (USD/MWh) for dispatchable baseload technologies




Source: NEA/IEA 2015

Note: Assumes region specific fuel prices for US, Europe, Asia; 85% load factor; CO2 price of 30 USD/tonne


- Large regional differences are observed.
- Nuclear is the lowest cost options for all countries at 3% discount rate.
- Median cost of nuclear is slightly lower than coal or gas at 7%, but is higher at 10%

## LCOE (USD/MWh) for wind and solar technologies



Source: NEA/IEA  
2015


- Cost of Renewables (in particular solar PV) has declined substantially since the last EGC and they are no longer cost outliers. Further cost reductions are expected.
- Plant-level costs are becoming of lesser importance. What is needed is the ability to ensure secure and cost-efficient supply at the system level.



## Nuclear energy is capital intensive

- 70% capital costs (up-front)
  - 20% of which are interests.
- 85% of Fixed Costs
- 15% of Variable Costs
- Decommissioning costs are negligible (*discounting*).

- Economics strongly depends on total investment costs (*overnight, lead time, discount rate*).
- Capital intensive technologies are highly sensitive to discount rate (*project risk*).
- Variable costs nuclear production are low, stable and well predictable over time.
- **Competitiveness of nuclear depends upon projects completion on time and budget.**




The cost structure of all low carbon technologies is very similar (high CAPEX, low OPEX), and they have similar “economic” characteristics.


However, the LCOE has major limitations:

- Considers technologies in isolation (*Plant-level costs*) and does not take into account the interactions between that power plant and the others nor the implication of integrating that PP into the system (*System effects*).
- Is simply a measure of cost and does not tell anything about the “value” of electricity generated (*when* electricity is generated).
- LCOE indicates production costs at the power plant gate, and thus does not takes into account for connection, transmission and distribution (*where*).


Challenges of VRE integration




1 Wind does not always blow



2 Difficult to predict




3 Good sites are distant from load centers



**At low financing costs, nuclear is a very competitive low carbon technology, especially when system effects are appropriately taken into account**



# Auto-correlation and declining market values of VRE



Will VRE always need to be subsidised ?

Is their LCOE declining faster than their value?

- The *auto-correlation* of VRE production reduces its effective contribution to the system and thus its **market value** at increasing penetration level.
- The decrease is much larger for solar PV than for wind.
- Such effect is not observed for a dispatchable plant.



# Co-existence of VRE and nuclear: Technical and economic challenges



- Short-term*
- Significant reduction in wholesale electricity prices: several PPs are unable to recover variable costs (peakers, OCGT, CCGT, but also capital intensive plants).
  - The financial situation of several utilities has strongly deteriorated, jeopardising their ability to take on new investments.
  - Risk-perception of the electricity sector has increased (higher cost of capital).
- Long-term*
- Need for more flexibility in to the system (storage, interconnection and market design, demand side management, **dispatchable and VRE generators**).
  - Declining load factors for NPPs (especially at high VRE shares or under strong carbon constraint).
  - More frequent and less predictable load-following operations.
  - More frequent and steeper ramping rates and more challenging operations.
  - Thousands hours with zero or very low electricity prices.
  - Very skewed and less predictable wholesale market revenues, relying in few hours with high scarcity prices: electricity price risk increases markedly.



**Is a new market design needed for low-carbon generation (VRE, nuclear)?**

## Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE)

## Overnight and variable costs



**Note:** Results are averages of 9 countries (Bel, Can, Fin, Fra, Ger, Jap, Kor, UK, US).

- Large increase in Overnight Costs, in particular since 2010 edition.
- Decrease in O&M and fuel costs
- Progressive increase in Lifetime and Load factors

# Cost escalation for nuclear: two analysis





Figure 36: Factors for increases in overnight capital costs  
(Overnight costs, USD per kW)



\* W. D'haeseleer: Synthesis of the economics of Nuclear Energy

\* University of Chicago: "Analysis of GW-Scale Overnight Capital Costs"

- Construction costs for nuclear has increased more than other PPs and much more than inflation (and fuel costs).
- Results for Europe show similar trends.

- Increase in overnight costs is partially explained by higher commodities prices
- Importance of the **project structure** and **agreements**: who is taking risk?
- Importance of **industrial organisation** and **regulatory framework**

- Massive and discontinuous technological change as Generation II nuclear power plants are substituted by larger, more expensive and often more complex Generation III+ plants (FOAK risks as well as licensing and regulatory change).
- Transition from West to East.
- Loss of expertise and human capital in many countries, as projects are few and far between (with the exception of China and Russia).
- Need to reconstruct a supply chain in most OECD countries after several years of low- or no-construction levels.
- A particularly complex supply chain with quality control issues and varying degrees of externalisation.
- Very long time frames at all levels of the value chain: from design and licensing to construction, operations and decommissioning.
- Shifts in political and social support after Fukushima.
- Changes in electricity markets and questions on the role of baseload power in EU.

Decarbonisation and NNB require in addition to carbon taxes **long-term electricity price arrangements** (long-term contracts, PPA, CfD) : the more stable are electricity prices, the lower are the financial risks and required interest rate and the more competitive is nuclear.

- a. Different models of project management offer different trade-offs between internal and external transaction costs.
- b. Advance the convergence and standardisation of engineering codes and quality standards in the global nuclear industry.
- c. Modularisation holds promises, but requires front-up investments and scale.
- d. Design completion and long lead-times for preparation are required.
- e. Transfer of lesson learned should be consciously organised.
- f. Promising new technologies (automatic welding, 4-season site shelters, high performance concrete, seismic stabilisators)
- g. Design standardisation (site specificity and regulatory level)
- h. Importance of “Soft issues” such as leadership, team building, experience, incentives and trust.

- **Growing concern about the competitiveness on nuclear power in NEA countries.**
- Some relevant material has been published and some work is ongoing in this area:
  - NEI, MIT (*The Future of Nuclear Energy* study)
  - WANO, WNA (CORDEL, World Nuclear supply Chain: Outlook 2035, Project structuring)
  - IAEA, NEA
- Areas for potential cost reduction may arise in 2 main areas:
  - Construction costs (Design, Manufacture, Procurement and construction)
  - Operational Costs (Reduction in outage duration, Longer cycles, Reduced man-power)
- Report will look broadly at the initiative currently ongoing and potential for costs reductions for both the new built and existing plants:
  - Industrial structure, Supply arrangements, Market competition
  - Reactor design and innovation, Role of safety
  - Analysis of specific examples of successful new build projects (i.e. UAE)
- The project will be undertaken under the supervision of an Expert Group in 18/19.

# Thank you for your attention

## **NEA studies are available on-line**

<http://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2012/7056-system-effects.pdf>


<http://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2015/7195-nn-build-2015.pdf>

<http://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2015/7057-proj-costs-electricity-2015.pdf>

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


- Current nuclear capacity of 390 GW to more than double by 2050 to reach over 900 GW, share of nuclear electricity would increase from 11% to 16%.
- China sees largest increase in installed capacity and becomes largest nuclear power producer.
- Formidable challenge: multiply current capacity by 2.3 in 35 years and increase investments in nuclear up to USD 110 billion/year over the period 2016-2050 (21 USD billion in 2015).
- *Similar trend by WNA and IAEA: WNA's objective of achieving 25% of supply by 2050. IAEA says 385 or 632 GW (low or high growth) by 2030.*

## Nuclear


- Large uncertainty in the construction phase
- Once a NPP is operating, rather stable and predictable production costs

### Risk premium of different power plants once operating




Source: John Parsons and Fernando de Sisternes, MIT

NUCLEAR



CCGT\*



During operation, the revenues risk of a NPP is lower than that of a power plant with higher operational costs (CCGT, coal), and of a Variable Renewable Plant (solar, wind).

# Quantification of profile costs

We compare two situations: the residual load duration curve for a 30% penetration of fluctuating wind (blue curve) and 30% penetration of a dispatchable technology (red curve).

